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Introduction 
Access to patented medicines protected by trade agreements, use of treaties to 
liberalize trade in tobacco products, growing trade in health services, and the impact of 
expanded trade on health equity within and across countries, are all examples of the 
increasingly important nexus between trade and health. Historically, trade and health 
have long affected each other but have tended to operate as separate policy spheres. In 
recent decades, these spheres have come together increasingly to form a rapidly 
expanding agenda, much of it requiring joint policy attention. Although some issues  
have produced closer cooperation, others have exposed tensions between the goals of 
protecting and promoting health, and generating wealth through trade in goods, services, 
and capital. 
This article is the first in a series on the evolving interface between trade and 
health. The series takes stock of this relationship in order to provide forward-looking 
analyses of this fluid and often controversial subject. Both trade and health have reached 
turning points, as issues in world affairs, and this series provides timely analysis of key 
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challenges facing efforts to achieve an appropriate balance between the two spheres 
across a diverse range of issues.  Of particular interest, for Lancet readers, is how health 
can best be protected and promoted amid rapidly expanding trade relations. 
This article sets the stage for this series by considering key issues that define the 
trade and health linkage. We focus, first, on how, in the past decade, both trade and 
health have risen and expanded on global policy agendas in unprecedented ways. Second, 
we begin to describe how the trade and health relationship is governed in international 
relations. This analysis reveals a contrast between trade’s structured and formalized 
governance system, and the “unstructured plurality” that characterises global health 
governance. This difference helps explain why trade agreements dominate the trade-
health relationship.  More detailed analysis of governance issues is provided in Paper 2. 
Third, this article examines the ongoing search for policy coherence between the 
two spheres. Policy coherence requires handling both direct and indirect linkages 
between health and trade, which, as discussed below, pose different policy and 
governance challenges. The trade and health nexus represents, therefore, a daunting 
agenda for national governments, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), the private 
sector, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  We conclude by describing the 
remaining articles in this series, which collectively seek to stimulate efforts to align the 
pursuit of health and wealth in a sustainable and mutually beneficial manner.  
 
A seminal convergence:  The rise of trade and health in world affairs 
The relationship between trade and health today exhibits unprecedented breadth, 
depth, and intensity. Historically, the oldest manifestation of this interface has been the 
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concern that trade spreads disease. Long before germ theory developed, governments 
adopted measures to prevent the importation of diseases associated with trade, such as 
plague and cholera.1 The growth in the use of quarantine measures, and the expansion of 
trade in the nineteenth century, led states to engage in more systematic cooperation.2 The 
international sanitary conferences and conventions, of the latter half of the nineteenth and 
first half of the twentieth centuries, constituted the first efforts at policy convergence, 
namely to produce international law that attempted to balance trade and health 
objectives.3 
Invariably, this convergence was defined by the trading powers of the day, was 
ostensibly framed to protect their trading interests, and gave no attention to the negative 
health consequences of imperialism arising from the economic exploitation of colonised 
territories.  Thus, the narrow scope of this early policy convergence focused on 
minimising the burden that national health measures (e.g., quarantine) imposed on the 
trading interests of the most economically powerful countries. Disease surveillance and 
data collection were limited to a handful of acute epidemic infections (e.g., cholera, 
plague, and yellow fever), the spread of which was associated with trade. The measures 
adopted focused on actions to be taken at the border to protect trading powers from 
external threats, and did not require states to improve, for example, health determinants 
within their own territories, let alone population health in other countries.   
It was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century that, alongside the 
adoption of international sanitary measures, actions began to be taken to improve 
conditions for labourers, albeit focused on the industrialising economies of Europe. The 
exploitation and appalling conditions in which factory workers toiled and lived fed the 
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emergence of communism and stimulated the eventual development of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) and labour standards after World War I, including 
occupational safety and health protections.4  This period also witnessed efforts to address 
the negative health and environmental consequences of transboundary pollution arising 
from industrialisation.5  Unlike the international sanitary conventions, these measures 
focused attention on health conditions and standards within countries, as well as on the 
responsibilities of states not to cause spillover harm in other countries through economic 
activities. Adverse health consequences associated with industrialisation implicated trade 
because industrial products were often the goods traded in international commerce. 
Competition from cheaper imports placed pressure on economic sectors to reduce costs, 
often at the risk of worker health and safety, and environmental degradation. This led to 
the ILO’s efforts to harmonise labour protections across countries, and attempts to 
control transboundary pollution through standards and treaties. 
Recognition of the direct and indirect links between trade and health waned 
during the Cold War. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),6 adopted in 
1947, and the International Sanitary Regulations (ISR, which later became the 
International Health Regulations (IHR)),7 adopted by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) in 1951, included provisions for balancing trade and health interests. However, 
although occasional controversies arose,8 GATT’s development did not include 
significant attention to the trade-health linkage. As trade became caught up in the 
geopolitical struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, the trade-health 
relationship was marginalised.   
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In international health cooperation, WHO’s  efforts to improve health in 
developing countries, through such strategies as Health for All, Essential Drugs List, and 
International Code on the Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes, raised deeper questions 
about the health implications of certain economic activities, including trade. As support 
by developing and socialist countries in the 1970s for a New International Economic 
Order intensified, the Health for All initiative and Declaration of Alma Ata became 
entangled in disputes between the West, the Soviet bloc, and the developing world.9  The 
bitterness of these conflicts ensured that little constructive attention was focused on the 
trade and health interface.  Instead, the focus on infectious diseases and trade continued 
through the IHR, but even these regulations faded in policy relevance as the Cold War 
progressed.10 
The interface between trade and health has changed substantively since the end of 
the Cold War, characterised foremost by a greater convergence of policy issues. The end 
of the ideological struggle leavened the international system for the expansion of the 
trade liberalisation project, initially begun under GATT and then advanced by the far-
reaching World Trade Organization (WTO). When established in 1947, GATT had 23 
contracting parties and was limited to trade in goods.11 Today, the WTO has 151 
members12 (which account for 97% of world trade13), with another 29 countries seeking 
accession,14 and includes trade in goods and services and the protection of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs). Trade liberalization--the lowering of restrictions on and barriers to 
the cross-border exchange and movement of goods, services, and investment capital—has 
emerged in the post-Cold War period as a leading political and economic strategy in 
advancing objectives in world affairs. Importantly, virtually all post-Cold War strategies 
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for development have identified trade and its expansion as critical to economic growth, 
including the lifting of people out of poverty in the developing world.15 
Simultaneously, health’s prominence in global politics has increased significantly 
since the 1990s, in part reminiscent of the nineteenth century in being defined by the 
preoccupations of powerful political and economic interests. This prominence has been 
particularly notable concerning the perceived threats posed by emerging and re-emerging 
communicable diseases, and biological terrorism. At the same time, health has featured 
prominently in new development initiatives, such as the importance accorded to health in 
the Millennium Development Goals.  While not all health needs have equally enjoyed 
this higher political status, global health has been transformed by its linkage to security, 
economic development, and humanitarian issues.  Consequently, addressing global health 
issues is perceived as important to national and international strategies for diplomatic 
activity, as witnessed by health’s rise as a foreign policy issue.16  
The acceleration of trade liberalisation, combined with the increased prominence 
of global health, over the past decade or so has produced the seminal policy convergence 
we see today. This convergence encompasses direct (e.g., link between trade and 
pathogen spread) and indirect (e.g., trade’s impact on the broad determinants of health) 
policy linkages.  While this convergence echoes issues from earlier periods, the 
unprecedented breadth, depth, and intensity of trade-health linkages pose new challenges. 
The policy agenda today covers flows of trade in industrial and agricultural 
goods, health-related services, protection of IPRs and investment capital, and their varied 
impacts across a range of communicable and non-communicable diseases, and health 
services provision and financing. The convergence of trade and health issues, thus, 
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requires both areas to adjust to the policy importance accorded to the other. Finding 
effective ways of making such adjustments has generated controversy because this may 
significantly affect how states exercise their sovereignty.  With much at stake, outcomes 
are also likely to be shaped by unequal political and economic power among countries, 
and differences in values and policy goals, including how the importance of equity in the 
distribution of health and wealth are perceived. 
 
Trade, health, and governance: The structure and dynamics of the trade-health 
relationship 
Balancing trade and health policies requires cooperation through international 
governance mechanisms. Comparing mechanisms within the two realms reveals why 
trade dominates governance of this relationship. The governance of international trade 
has a highly structured, formalized, and demanding system.  In contrast, international 
health governance exhibits little structural coherence, greater diversity of actors and 
approaches, and weaker legal obligations on states. 
The WTO is the centre of authority for the governance of trade, as reflected in the 
large number of its member states and the substantive reach of its agreements. Other 
articles in this series examine the health implications of specific WTO agreements, such 
as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)17 and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).18 Here, we emphasise cross 
cutting WTO features that affect the trade-health relationship.  
The first feature reflects how the WTO facilitates trade among member states 
through centralised and comprehensive governance architecture. The strategic objective 
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of trade liberalization within a multilateral system has produced, in the WTO, a core 
structure with strong legal foundations (e.g., GATT) and the incentive and capacity to 
handle new issues (e.g., GATS, TRIPS). This architecture contrasts with the 
“unstructured plurality” of governance in global health.19 Rather than centring around 
WHO, global health governance has fragmented, diversified, and multiplied in ways that 
challenge WHO’s lead role as the UN specialised agency for health.  
Second, the WTO’s political and substantive scope is critical to understanding its 
impact on trade and health issues. Politically, WTO’s membership is extensive and 
expanding. This reality demonstrates the WTO’s importance to developed and 
developing states. In thirteen years, the WTO has become one of the most significant 
IGOs because of the widely shared perception that economic growth and public welfare 
depend on participation in a robust system of international trade.  
By contrast, WHO’s influence mainly derives from its technical expertise used in 
the promotion of non-binding collective action across its member states (e.g., eradication 
of smallpox and polio).  WHO is also expected to address new and emerging global 
health issues (e.g., public health innovation and IPRs; sharing of influenza viruses and 
related benefits). Only recently have member states used WHO as a forum to negotiate 
international legal instruments (the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control20 and the 
International Health Regulations 200521). 
Substantively, the scope of issues covered by WTO agreements is breathtaking. 
To become a WTO member, a state has to agree to accept no less than 17 main 
multilateral agreements and 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and understandings that 
contain binding obligations on, among other things, tariffs and non-tariff barriers on 
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industrial and agricultural goods, trade in all kinds of services, application of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, implementation of technical barriers to trade, use of trade-related 
investment measures, imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and 
protection of IPRs. The large number of WTO member states means that most of the 
international system has committed itself to implementing this vast array of obligations. 
Although the WHO Constitution contains a broad definition of health, WHO 
membership does not involve acceptance of multiple, extensive legal obligations. The 
WHO Constitution does not require member states to accept other international legal 
rules,22 so WHO membership lacks the broad, deep, and binding commitments WTO 
membership imposes. This observation does not mean that WHO member states refrain 
from entering into other international agreements. These other arrangements, such as 
human rights and environmental treaties, have arisen outside WHO’s auspices, creating a 
patchwork effect rather than a centralised, integrated set of legal obligations on health. 
Third, WTO agreements place extensive demands on member states. Each WTO 
agreement contains detailed, complex, and legally binding requirements that seriously 
discipline the sovereignty of WTO member states. These requirements test the skill of 
trade lawyers, let alone health experts coming to this field without training. In contrast, 
WHO membership is not legally demanding on states, and historically other international 
legal agreements directly affecting health have not contained extensive duties (e.g., the 
ISR/IHR) or detailed and specific requirements (e.g., human right to health). In addition, 
voluntary membership in new global health initiatives, such as the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria23 and the International Finance Facility for 
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Immunisation,24 have not been created through treaty law and thus do not impose legal 
obligations on participating states. 
Fourth, the WTO reinforces the scope and demanding nature of its rules through 
its dispute settlement mechanism. Unlike most areas of international law, the WTO’s 
dispute settlement provisions are comprehensive, covering disputes under all mandatory 
WTO agreements, and are compulsory.25 This combination makes the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism an authoritative source of interpretation for its agreements. In 
addition, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism allows members states prevailing in 
disputes to use trade sanctions to enforce rulings against member states that fail to 
comply with decisions. Given the number of WTO member states and the demanding 
nature of many WTO rules, authoritative interpretations and the potential for enforcement 
carry far-reaching implications for trade and other policy efforts that trade liberalization 
affects. Decisions by WTO dispute panels and the Appellate Body become, thus, focal 
points for the governance of trade’s relationship with other areas, including health. The 
importance of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism has drawn much attention to 
how it functions, and proponents and critics of the mechanism’s structure and 
performance are abundant. 
In contrast, health-specific legal agreements, such as the Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (FCTC) or the revised International Health Regulations (IHR 2005), 
do not contain compulsory dispute settlement and enforcement provisions, and thus lack 
the compliance bite WTO rules have. This difference may affect how seriously states take 
obligations connected to the two organisations. Consequently, the WTO dispute 
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settlement mechanism heightens the political and economic significance of compliance 
with WTO rules, including those rules that may affect health policy. 
The above features of the WTO help explain why governance of the trade-health 
relationship is weighted toward international trade law. Although it raises concerns about 
the future of WTO’s centralised architecture, the proliferation of regional and bilateral 
trade agreements reinforces international trade law’s dominant governance role in the 
trade and health area. These observations do not discount health’s increased political 
importance, but they highlight that this prominence exists in a governance context 
marked by the WTO regime. Efforts to shift governance of trade and health away from 
trade agreements have proven controversial and not entirely effective, as witnessed by 
problems concerning IPRs. This context draws attention to larger political questions that 
focus on why governance of trade relations and health problems in international relations 
are markedly different, and these questions force consideration of the relative weight 
given to trade and economic issues by states in the formulation of their national interests.  
Given this reality, a key question becomes whether this governance environment 
permits states to pursue trade and health interests in ways that do not privilege one area to 
the detriment of the other. Paper 2 in this series examines the governance of trade and 
health in greater detail, including the prospects for achieving more appropriate and 
effective policy coherence between trade and health.  
 
Towards policy coherence: Understanding the direct and indirect linkages between trade 
and health 
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The convergence of trade and health policy, amid the current dominance of trade 
governance, creates important challenges for the public health community. Policy 
coherence requires common ground with respect to substantive policy objectives, which 
is often not easy to find or construct because of divergent public and private interests. 
The search for policy coherence is also complicated by the need for a broad agenda 
because trade and health have direct and indirect linkages (see below).  In addition, trade 
and health coherence has to be achieved within and across individual states. Papers in this 
series explore specific areas of this trade-health relationship, but here we provide general 
considerations about the intensifying search for policy coherence. 
An initial challenge is developing clearer evidence of how trade affects 
population health and health policy. Where the link is direct, such as trade in goods 
contaminated with harmful pathogens or containing dangerous substances, coherence 
analysis focuses on whether specific trade-restricting health measures comply with 
particular rules in trade (e.g., GATT) or health (e.g., IHR 2005) agreements:  Was the 
measure applied in a non-discriminatory manner, based on scientific evidence, or the 
least trade-restrictive measure reasonably available to achieve the level of health 
protection sought? Controversies arise in applying these trade and health rules (e.g., how 
much scientific evidence is sufficient?), but these questions are rule-based, require case-
by-case factual determinations, do not invite ideological debate, and make good 
candidates for third-party dispute settlement. For example, whether a WTO member has 
conducted an adequate risk assessment before imposing a trade-restrictive measure is a 
question frequently adjudicated before the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in the 
area of sanitary and phytosanitary protection.  
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The coherence  allowed by each rule must be assessed by the rule-based, case-by-
case analysis of direct linkage problems. Some rules, such as the prohibition on 
discriminatory trade measures, may pose no concerns for health. Health officials do not 
need to discriminate on the basis of the origin of a product in order to protect health from 
direct trade-related threats because such a basis finds no support in scientific principles or 
evidence. Other rules, such as the requirement for trade-restricting health measures to be 
the least trade-restrictive measures reasonably available, raise more coherency concerns. 
Disagreements arise over whether one measure is more or less trade restrictive than 
another, and over whether the least trade-restrictive measure is actually feasible for the 
country in question to implement. These issues hinge on how states or dispute settlement 
mechanisms interpret the rules. Authoritative interpretations of WTO rules have a 
uniformity of meaning across the international system, even if the meaning remains 
controversial among some states and non-state actors. 
The possibility of policy coherence  from the application of the rules does not, 
however, ensure policy coherence in practice. Countries may not take advantage of the 
policy space they are afforded by trade and health governance mechanisms, but such 
failures to act may flow from lack of political will, competence, or capability rather than 
the presence of skewed rules.  For example, many direct linkage contexts (e.g., 
liberalising trade in health-related services26) require sophisticated analysis in order for 
policy makers to achieve their political and economic objectives (e.g., wealth creation, 
economic and health equities) for their populations.    
Even greater difficulty can arise when there is an indirect causal relationship 
between trade and health.  For example, trade may affect macroeconomic conditions that, 
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in turn, influence employment levels and income equities, which affect access to health 
services. Or, trade may form only part of the explanation for certain problems (e.g., 
access to essential medicines; the growth in obesity-related diseases; health harms from 
environmental degradation). Where such indirect linkages exist, what coherence should 
look like, how it should be achieved, and how it relates to concepts of fairness and equity, 
constitute more difficult questions because the number and nature of the variables to be 
analysed and regulated is considerable.  Simplistic responses, such as ignoring trade’s 
indirect impact on health or blanket opposition to trade liberalisation, do not provide 
foundations for policy coherence. 
Where indirect linkages exist, coherence analysis is not typically rule-based and 
does not proceed through case-by-case determinations of trade measures applied to 
products or services. Rather, analysis of indirect trade-health linkages tends to lead to 
“big picture” questions that invite debate about larger governance challenges. For 
example, if data indicate that government health expenditures declined because tariff 
revenues decreased under trade liberalisation agreements, is the proper response to 
restrict trade by increasing tariffs, or to find strategies for financing health care not 
dependent on high, fixed tariff rates? Or, if trade liberalisation leads to economic growth 
but, at the same time, to greater income inequality which, in turn, reduces access to health 
services, what is the appropriate policy response higher trade barriers, more progressive 
taxation of incomes, or increased health care expenditure? More broadly, does the 
combination of trade liberalisation strategies and other policy reforms (e.g., deregulation 
of the economy, privatization of government-run services) unduly limit the range of 
options available for addressing inequities in income and access to health services?  
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The application of treaty interpretation principles does not provide answers to 
these broader policy choices, nor would there be uniformity in the answers across all 
countries. Achieving policy coherence in situations of indirect linkage often does not 
involve fine-grained, simultaneous balancing of trade and health interests in specific 
cases under detailed rules. Rather, it unfolds through separate responses in distinct policy 
spheres using multiple instruments at different times (e.g., liberalise trade internationally 
through trade law, redistribute wealth domestically through national fiscal measures, and 
reform access to health services through health policy). In addition, indirect linkages raise 
ideological considerations because the issues invite articulation of value-based 
preferences within and among societies. 
The indirect linkage between the international trade of foods and drink, and the 
obesity pandemic, provides a good example of these analytical dynamics. Trade 
constitutes only one variable in a complex set of factors that contribute to obesity,27 and 
evidence that addressing obesity specifically through direct trade policies (as opposed to 
general economic measures applicable to all goods and services, such as marketing 
restrictions) would be effective is non-existent. The complexity of the obesity problem 
invites expression of political perspectives that frame responses to obesity in different 
ways—“preventing and controlling obesity is an individual responsibility not the duty of 
the ‘nanny State’” versus “obesity management requires government intervention to 
protect vulnerable individuals from corporate exploitation.” 
As the obesity example illustrates, what policy coherence between trade and 
health actually means in practice is difficult to pinpoint. Management of such indirect 
linkages requires more than fine-tuning the application of specific rules under trade and 
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health agreements. What is feasible in addressing indirect linkages would vary from 
country to country, and conceptions of equity and fairness differ between trade and health 
sectors within and between countries. These observations apply, for example, to tensions 
over the protection of IPRs, an issue on which coherence has remained technically, 
politically, and philosophically elusive. 
To make things more complicated, the larger political footprint of indirect linkage 
problems also invites analysis on how such problems get managed in trade and health 
venues. Do the strong do what they will, while the weak suffer what they must, or are 
trade and health governance mechanisms capable of producing more symmetry between 
trade and health interests in indirect linkage areas? 
 
Conclusion 
The relationship between trade and health in the early 21st century is as important 
as it is complicated and controversial. The convergence of trade and health in recent 
decades, the structure and dynamics of governance to address this relationship, and the 
ongoing search for policy coherence nationally and globally underscore the imperative of 
finding ways to manage the pursuit of health and wealth more effectively. The purpose of 
the remaining articles in this series is to flesh out this imperative through analysis of key 
inflection points in trade and health. 
The second paper in this series delves more deeply into the governance 
challenges, tracing the origins of the global trading system and international health 
cooperation.  As well as the differences in the two policy spheres described above, the 
paper assesses how effectively the two systems come together, and how current deficits 
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in the representation of health interests within the governance of international trade might 
be addressed.  Paper 3…[insert].  Paper 4…[insert].  Paper 5…[insert].  The final paper 
in this series outlines three priority areas in terms of the major challenges faced and 
actions required.  These form the basis of a trade and health Agenda for Action. 
Trade and health policies are at turning points in their respective political and 
governance trajectories. The WTO’s Doha Development Agenda has stagnated, leading 
to an explosion in regional and bilateral trade agreements, the portents of which for the 
trade-health linkage remain uncertain, especially in the controversial area of protection of 
IPRs (see Paper [ ] in this series).28 Global health’s rise to political prominence has 
stimulated hard questions about whether states, IGOs, the private sector, and NGOs will 
harness or squander this prominence within and beyond the world of trade. The breadth, 
depth, and intensity of the trade and health linkage connect these two trajectories in ways 
vital to the prospects of both policy endeavours. 
Trade and health have a long history that has seen these areas converge and 
diverge at different points in time. The current convergence, and the search for 
coherence, will define the trade and health relationship for decades. Whether those in 
both policy communities understand fully the trade and health imperative, and its 
technical and political challenges, will influence how these critical objectives in global 
affairs will shape the future of states and their peoples. 
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